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On the Conceptual and the Empirical
A CRITIQUE OF JOHN MIKHAIL’S COGNITIVISM
Dennis Patterson†
INTRODUCTION
This symposium was convened to consider the question
of scientific truth. Of course, there are many questions one
might ask about scientific truth. The most obvious question
is whether “truth” names a property and, if so, what sort of
property is it? If truth is not a property, then how are we to
conceive of it? Is it a relation? If it is, between what things
does the relation hold? Sentences or states-of-affairs are
possible candidates. While important, these questions are best
approached after one has addressed a more fundamental issue,
that of the distinction between the conceptual and the
empirical.
In this Article, I will argue for two claims: First, there is
in fact a distinction between conceptual and empirical
questions. Second, conceptual questions are prior to (that is,
they antecede) matters of truth and falsehood.1 The relation†
Board of Governors Professor of Law and Philosophy, Co-Director,
Institute for Law and Philosophy, Rutgers University, School of Law (Camden);
Professor of Jurisprudence and International Trade, Swansea University, School of
Law, Wales, U.K.
1
Bennett and Hacker explain the empirical/conceptual distinction and its
importance for empirical inquiry in the specific context of neuroscience.

Conceptual questions antecede matters of truth and falsehood. They are
questions concerning our forms of representation, not questions concerning
the truth and falsehood of empirical statements. These forms are
presupposed by true (and false) scientific statements and by correct (and
incorrect) scientific theories. They determine not what is empirically true or
false, but rather what does and what does not make sense. Hence conceptual
questions are not amenable to scientific investigation and experimentation or
to scientific theorizing. For the concepts and conceptual relationships in
question are presupposed by any such investigations and theorizings. Our
concern here is not with trade union demarcation lines, but with distinctions
between logically different kinds of intellectual inquiry. . . . .
Distinguishing conceptual questions from empirical ones is of the first
importance. When a conceptual question is confused with a scientific one, it is
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ship between the conceptual and the empirical is important
because any empirical inquiry that proceeds from conceptual
confusion cannot yield satisfactory results.
After setting out the distinctions just outlined in Part I,
I will illustrate my claims in Parts II-V with reference to recent
work by John Mikhail on moral cognition. Just as Noam
Chomsky hypothesizes a universal linguistic grammar to
explain speech behavior, so too, Mikhail argues, we can explain
the moral behavior of persons in terms of universal moral
grammar” (“UMG”).2 I will argue that Mikhail’s claims on
behalf of UMG suffer from conceptual confusions that are not
amenable to empirical resolution.3
I.

THE EMPIRICAL AND THE CONCEPTUAL

There is an important distinction between conceptual
and empirical questions. Empirical assertions are claims of
fact. They are tested by the methodology of science, that is,
through experimentation. In the realm of cognition, neuro- and
cognitive scientists test hypotheses about brain functions. To
bound to appear singularly refractory. It seems in such cases as if science
should be able to discover the truth of the matter under investigation by
theory and experiment—yet it persistently fails to do so. That is not
surprising, since conceptual questions are no more amenable to empirical
methods of investigation than problems in pure mathematics are solvable by
the methods of physics. Furthermore, when empirical problems are addressed
without adequate conceptual clarity, misconceived questions are bound to be
raised, and misdirected research is likely to ensue. For any unclarity
regarding the relevant concepts will be reflected in corresponding unclarity in
the questions, and hence in the design of experiments intended to answer
them. And any incoherence in the grasp of the relevant conceptual structure
is likely to be manifest in incoherences in the interpretation of the results of
experiments.
M.R. BENNETT & P.M.S. HACKER, Introduction to PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
NEUROSCIENCE 2 (2003). I discuss the importance of Bennett and Hacker’s critique of
cognitivism in Dennis Patterson, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, NOTRE
DAME PHIL. REVIEWS (2003), http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=1335 (book review).
2
John Mikhail, Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence and the
Future, 11 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 143, 143 (2007). A central claim Mikhail makes is
that “the mind contains a moral grammar.” Id. at 144. Mikhail makes clear that his
account of moral grammar is a “computational” theory. Id. at 143.
3
Mikhail claims that “further research is needed to clarify the relevant
conceptual and evidentiary issues.” Id. at 148. I contend that more research will clarify
nothing because the research program is fundamentally misconceived. I discuss these
issues more broadly in Dennis Patterson, Fashionable Nonsense, 81 TEX. L. REV. 841
(2003) (review essay discussing ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME E. BRUNER,
MINDING THE LAW (2000); STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE
AND MIND (2001); VINCENT DESCOMBES, THE MIND’S PROVISIONS: A CRITIQUE OF
COGNITIVISM (Stephen Adam Schwartz, trans., 2001)).
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take just one example, neuroscientists are particularly
interested in correlating brain function with emotional and
behavioral responses.4 Such work is thought to provide insight
into the connection between the brain and behavior.
Conceptual questions, on the other hand, involve
matters of sense.5 They are not amenable to empirical assessment, confirmation, or analysis. Conceptual relationships are
presupposed by empirical claims. If there is conceptual
confusion, then nothing of empirical value can obtain. The
success of empirical inquiry depends upon conceptual clarity
(that is, the absence of conceptual error or confusion).
Some neuroscientists are not content with limiting their
work to brain functions and have given in to speculation about
the relationship between the mind and the brain. Consider the
concept of “mind.” The question “what is mind?” or “what is a
mind?” implicates a panoply of other concepts like “vision,”
“understanding,” and “thought.” The question “what is mind?”
is conceptual and not empirical because, among other reasons,
no experiment could answer the question. An answer to the
question “what is mind?” requires a different sort of reply than
we give to the question “where in the brain does one find the
medulla?”
4
A recent example is Dean Mobbs et al., Law, Responsibility, and the Brain,
5 PLOS BIOLOGY 693 (2007), available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/
picrender.fcgi?artid=1852146&blobtype=pdf.
5
Bennett and Hacker explain the relationship of sense to truth thus:

Cognitive neuroscience is an experimental investigation that aims to discover
empirical truths concerning the neural foundations of human faculties and
the neural processes that accompany their exercise. A precondition of truth is
sense. If a form of words makes no sense, then it won’t express a truth. If it
does not express a truth, then it can’t explain anything. Philosophical
investigation into the conceptual foundations of neuroscience aims to disclose
and clarify conceptual truths that are presupposed by, and are conditions of
the sense of, cogent descriptions of cognitive neuroscientific discoveries and
theories. If conducted correctly, it will illuminate neuroscientific experiments
and their description as well as the inferences that can be drawn from them.
In Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience we delineated the
conceptual network formed by families of psychological concepts. These
concepts are presupposed by cognitive neuroscientific research into the
neural basis of human cognitive, cogitative, affective, and volitional powers.
If the logical relations of implication, exclusion, compatibility, and
presupposition that characterize the use of these concepts are not respected,
invalid inferences are likely to be drawn, valid inferences are likely to be
overlooked, and nonsensical combinations of words are likely to be treated as
making sense.
Maxwell Bennett & Peter Hacker, The Conceptual Presuppositions of Cognitive
Neuroscience: A Reply to Critics, in MAXWELL BENNETT ET AL., NEUROSCIENCE AND
PHILOSOPHY: BRAIN, MIND, AND LANGUAGE 127, 128 (2007) (footnote omitted).
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Conceptual confusions arise in a variety of ways and can
take several forms.6 Fundamentally, error can arise from
failure to employ words in accordance with the rules for their
use. But confusion can also arise in more complex ways.
Professor Mikhail errs when he tries to locate moral knowledge
in a “place,” that place being the mind. This form of conceptual
error, I will argue, undermines Mikhail’s arguments for the
explanatory power of UMG.
II.

MIND AND MORAL GRAMMAR

Now to the more complicated subject of “mind.” What
are the proper forms of expression for referring to “the mind”?
To this point, I have endeavored only to make the point that
the question “what is mind?” is not amenable to an empirical
answer and that the answer it requires is bound up with rules
for the use of words and expressions associated with our neural
capacities. Now, I shall detail the central claims made by
Mikhail on behalf of the theory of UMG before suggesting why
these claims are conceptually confused.
I start with what Mikhail identifies as the core
questions for UMG before considering Mikhail’s key claims.
These questions frame Mikhail’s inquiry into the nature of
mind and delineate the central focus of his research into the
relationship between mind and moral knowledge. He asks:
1. What constitutes moral knowledge?
2. How is moral knowledge acquired?
3. How is moral knowledge put to use?
4. How is moral knowledge physically realized in the brain?
5. How did moral knowledge evolve in the species?7

In describing the main features of our innate moral
capacity, Mikhail makes a number of key claims about the
nature of mind and moral grammar. These are:
1. “[T]he mind contains a moral grammar . . . .”8

6
I discuss this topic in connection with philosophical naturalism in Dennis
Patterson & John Oberdiek, Moral Evaluation and Conceptual Analysis in
Jurisprudential Methodology, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 60-75 (Michael Freeman & Ross
Harrison eds., 2007).
7
Mikhail, supra note 2, at 144.
8
Id.
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2. “[T]he manner in which this grammar is acquired
implies that at least some of its core attributes are
innate, where ‘innate’ is used in a dispositional sense
to refer to cognitive systems whose essential
properties are largely pre-determined by the inherent
structure of the mind . . . .”9
3. Moral intuitions “are best explained by assuming
[that individuals] possess tacit knowledge of specific
rules, concepts or principles.”10
I shall accept Mikhail’s claims about the nature of mind and,
further, assume arguendo the truth of his claims about the role
and function of moral grammar.
Nevertheless, Mikhail makes at least two philosophically suspect claims about the relationship between mind and
moral grammar. These claims hint at larger, more structural
problems with UMG. These are the two claims:
1. Moral knowledge is in the mind (brain);11 and
2. Moral reasoning is a matter of unconscious application/interpretation of rules, principles, and “domain
specific algorithms.”12
The first claim involves the locus of the mind’s tool for solving
ethical problems. In the course of solving these problems,
Mikhail argues, the mind accomplishes its moral computational tasks unconsciously. The second claim asserts that
the mind’s methodology for tackling ethical problems is
“interpretation.”13
There are two problems with the idea that we can
explain moral cognition with the claim that the mind follows
rules by unconsciously interpreting their requirements in
particular cases. The first involves the claim that to understand what a rule requires we need to interpret it. The second
9

Id.
Id.
11
Id. (“[T]he mind contains a moral grammar.”). This grammar is “innate” in
that its “essential properties are largely pre-determined by the inherent structure of
the mind.” Id.
12
Id. at 148. Knowledge of these moral rules is “tacit.” Id. at 145. In solving
ethical problems, “a pattern of organization . . . is imposed on the stimulus by the mind
itself.” Id. The process of computation is “unconscious.” Id.
13
Mikhail puts it this way: “[H]ow the mind goes about interpreting these
novel fact patterns, and assigning a deontic status to the acts they depict, is not
revealed in any obvious way by the scenarios themselves.” Id.
10
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involves the claim that “following a rule” is something a person
does “unconsciously.” Neither of these claims makes sense; and,
lacking sense, neither is amenable to empirical testing (that is,
experiment).
III.

UNDERSTANDING AS INTERPRETATION

Mikhail’s claim that we follow rules by interpreting
them is one made in a wide variety of humanistic and socialscientific disciplines.14 The problem with the claim is structural
and conceptual. If understanding a rule first requires
interpretation of it, then there is no reason why the
interpretation itself does not similarly stand in need of
interpretation. This process of interpretive regression can go on
infinitely.15 Hence, the term “infinite regress” has been used to
describe the argument against the idea that to be understood,
rules must first be “interpreted.”16 This argument, however, is
14
For detailed discussion, see generally Dennis Patterson, The Poverty of
Interpretive Universalism: Toward the Reconstruction of Legal Theory, 72 TEX. L. REV.
1 (1993).
15
Wittgenstein made the point this way:

“But how can a rule shew me what I have to do at this point? Whatever I do
is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule.”—That is not what we
ought to say, but rather: any interpretation still hangs in the air along with
what it interprets, and cannot give it any support. Interpretations by
themselves do not determine meaning.
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 198 (G.E.M. Anscome
trans., 1958); see also ROBERT B. BRANDOM, MAKING IT EXPLICIT: REASONING,
REPRESENTING, AND DISCURSIVE COMMITMENT 508-09 (1994) (“Linguistic understanding depends on interpretation . . . only in extraordinary situations—where
different languages are involved, or where ordinary communication has broken
down.”); Jeff Coulter, Is Contextualising Necessarily Interpretive?, 21 J. PRAGMATICS
689, 692 (1994) (“Understanding is not an activity: it is akin to an ability. To
understand is to have achieved knowledge of some kind, whilst interpreting is an
activity which is akin to hypothesis formation or, in a different sense, to the
assignment of significance (explanatory or otherwise) broader than the determination
of intelligibility.” (footnote omitted)).
16
Peter Hacker explains:
[I]t is a grievous error to think that in understanding an utterance one
always or even usually engages in interpretation. To interpret an utterance is
to explain it, typically to paraphrase it in the same language or to translate it
into a different language. . . . Obscurities, ambiguities or complexities may
call out for an interpretation, but it would be wholly incoherent to think that
all understanding is interpreting. For then the interpretation given, i.e. the
paraphrase, would itself stand in need of an interpretation in order to be
understood; and a vicious regress would be generated. This misconception
has manifold roots. One is the bizarre idea that what we hear or utter are
mere sounds which have to be correlated with or mapped on to meanings in
order to be understood. But we no more hear or utter mere sounds than we
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compressed: I shall spell it out in more detail, using
Wittgenstein’s arguments regarding understanding and interpretation to support my case.17
Wittgenstein’s basic claim is that “understanding” is
primary and “interpretation” a second-order or “parasitic”
activity.18 Interpretation is parasitic in the sense that interpretation only arises where understanding is already in place.
Understanding, according to Wittgenstein, is unreflective
action. When we follow rules, we do so without second-guessing
ourselves and without reflection on what the rule requires.
Wittgenstein begins his argument for the primacy of
understanding by presenting us with a paradox. He writes:
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a
rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with
the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord
with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so
there would be neither accord nor conflict here.19

Why does Wittgenstein question the importance of interpretation as an explanation of meaning (that is, as an explanation
of what it is to grasp the meaning of a rule or what the rule
requires by way of correct action)? His point is that if the
understanding of an utterance or sign were a matter of
advancing an interpretation (which is just another utterance or
sign), then the interpretation itself would require its own
interpretation, and so on, infinitely. This argument—the
infinite regress argument—is meant to inspire us to question
the idea of understanding as interpretation. Wittgenstein urges
us to rethink the notion that before we can understand an
utterance we must first interpret it. According to him, understanding a rule is fundamental to our role as participants in
practice. Interpretation, by contrast, is an activity we engage
in when our understanding breaks down.
Wittgenstein’s insight is that rule-following is not a
mental phenomenon. Succinctly stated, Wittgenstein relocates
normativity in action, specifically in social action. The
see or paint mere patches of colour. We hear and utter meaningful words and
sentences . . . .
P.M.S. Hacker, Language, Rules and Pseudo-Rules, 8 LANGUAGE & COMM. 159, 168
(1988).
17
For detailed discussion of the understanding/interpretation distinction and
its relevance for law, see DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 86-88 (1996).
18
WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 15, §§ 139-242.
19
Id. § 201.
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normativity of rule-following—the ground of correctness and
incorrectness—is not to be found in the agreement of others as
such. Rather, the agreement of rule-followers over time is the
ground of understanding. Agreement is a necessary feature of
the normativity of our practices, but the agreement must be a
regularity in reaction to use. In short, when we say there must
be “agreement in actions” what we are really saying is that
there must be harmony in application over time.20 This
harmony in reaction and application is constitutive of all
practices, including legal practice. It is the basis of our legal
judgments.
The distinction between correct and incorrect rulefollowing is a matter of community agreement in judgments
over time.21 If Wittgenstein is correct, then the idea of
unconscious rule-following is nonsensical. Following a rule,
making judgments about what a rule requires, and the very
idea of normativity itself require a role for others in the
intersubjective constitution of norms of correctness. The
Mikhail/Chomsky view of rule-following never gains traction
because it never moves beyond the ground of the internal
constitution of mind.

20

For discussion, see MEREDITH WILLIAMS, WITTGENSTEIN, MIND AND
MEANING: TOWARD A SOCIAL CONCEPTION OF MIND 176 (1999).
It is in this sense that community agreement is constitutive of practices, and
that agreement must be displayed in action. There are two important
features about this account that need to be highlighted. First, it is the
social practice that provides the structure within which individual
understanding can obtain or individual judgement be made. Central to
Wittgenstein’s thought is the claim, repeatedly argued for, that no isolated
event or behavior can correctly be described as naming or obeying or
understanding. The rule as formula, the standard as chart, or the paradigm
as an instance have no normative or representational status in their own
right. They have this status only in virtue of the way the formula or the
chart or the instance is used. It is the use that creates the structured context
within which sign-posts point, series can be continued, orders be obeyed and
paradigms be exemplary. Only then can we see a particular action as
embodying or instancing a grammatical structure. In short, the mandatory
stage setting is social practice.
Second, community agreement does not constitute a justification for
particular judgements. What is indispensable for correct, or appropriate,
judgement and action is that there is concord, not that each individual
justifies his (or anyone else’s) judgement and action by appeal to its harmony
with the judgement of others.
Id. (footnote omitted).
21
See id. at 169.
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UNCONSCIOUS RULE-FOLLOWING

Like Chomsky’s rules of generative grammar,22
Mikhail’s UMG postulates innate knowledge of a moral
grammar. This claim makes no sense. How can a child be
said to “know” moral norms without ever being conscious of
them? In other words, before a child even learns a syllable of
language, how can she be said to possess moral knowledge?
The problem posed by this question cannot be avoided
by asserting that we “follow” rules “unconsciously.” Again, the
problem is conceptual.23 “Rule-following” includes a panoply of
normative activities. When we follow rules we do the following
things:
1. Justify our behavior by reference to the rule;
2. Consult the rule in deciding on a course of conduct;
3. Correct our behavior and that of others by reference
to the rule; and
4. Interpret the rule when we fail to understand what it
requires.
It is difficult to see how these normative activities are possible
when we are unconscious of the existence of the rule. Of course,
we may act in a manner consistent with a rule. But that is not
to say that we are following the rule, for to do that would
require that we do all the things I just mentioned. Thus,
Mikhail’s claim that a person follows a rule unconsciously is
untenable.
V.

MIND, MORAL GRAMMAR, AND KNOWLEDGE

Finally, I come to Mikhail’s most fundamental claim,
that is, that “the mind contains a moral grammar”24 and that
22
Generative grammar is a theory of syntax. The grammar takes the form of
a system of formalized rules which mechanically generate all and only the grammatical
sentences of a language. See generally NOAM CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF
SYNTAX 3-10 (1965).
23
In the opinion of one careful reader, Chomsky—the inspiration for
Professor Mikhail’s model of unconscious rule-following—has abandoned the idea. See
John Searle, End of the Revolution, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 28, 2002, at 36 (reviewing
NOAM CHOMSKY, NEW HORIZONS IN THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE AND MIND (2000))
(“Chomsky has now given up on the idea that Universal Grammar is a matter of
unconscious rule-following. But he also dismisses the idea that real human languages
are governed by rules. That, I believe, cannot be right.”).
24
Mikhail, supra note 2, at 144.
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this grammar is part of “the inherent structure of the mind.”25
Like all forms of rationalism, Mikhail’s premise is that the
object of explanation (in this case, moral knowledge) is located
in a place. In Mikhail’s view, moral knowledge is in the mind.
This claim is confused because “knowledge” is an ability
and not a thing. “Know” is a success verb, not a referent.26 To
“know” something is neither to be in a certain state nor is it to
be in possession of a particular structure of mind or brain.27
Like all abilities, the ability to know moral rules is exhibited in
behavior. Criteria for the ascription of knowledge consist of
correct performances. “Knowledge” includes, among other
things, being able to spot error, explain the error, and correct
it. In doing these things, one demonstrates that one has
mastered rules—not that one’s mind or brain “contains” the
rules.28
Consider: when we say “Jones knows the train schedule
from Warsaw to Krakow,” we are not saying that Jones has the
schedule hard-wired into his mind. Even if he did, that would
still not be sufficient to say that he “knows” the schedule
because to know the schedule means knowing how to read the
schedule correctly. To do this, Jones needs to be able to do
things with the schedule. It is that doing that is the ground of
the ascription “Jones knows.” Since knowledge is an ability,
rather than a thing, it cannot be located in the brain, or
anywhere else for that matter.
There is also a more fundamental problem with
Mikhail’s account of UMG, one that goes beyond the confusion
of an ability with a thing. The problem is that Mikhail thinks
that the mind is a “place.” In this place, Mikhail locates the
moral grammar whose “inherent structure” explains our
behavior. But there is no such place as “the mind.” John Searle
recently compared thinking with digestion.29 He postulated that
just as digestion occurs in the stomach, so does consciousness
25

Id.
Of course, when we make a decision, many things may cross our mind or
come to mind. The causal processes for these are varied and many. But none of these
accompaniments constitutes “thinking” or “deciding.”
27
ANTHONY KENNY, THE LEGACY OF WITTGENSTEIN 129 (1984) (“To contain
information is to be in a certain state, while to know something is to possess a certain
capacity.”).
28
See P.M.S. Hacker, Chomsky’s Problems, 10 LANGUAGE & COMM. 127, 12829 (1990).
29
See John Searle, Putting Consciousness Back in the Brain: Reply to Bennett
and Hacker, Philosophical Foundations in Neuroscience, in BENNETT ET AL., supra note
5, at 97, 108-09.
26
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occur in the brain.30 Because we predicate both thinking and
digesting to persons, these important capacities could each be
located in a person.
But the analogy does not hold. If we open someone’s
stomach, we can see the process of digestion occurring. But if
we open someone’s brain or mind,31 we do not find anything we
might call “thinking.”32 Of course, Mikhail’s point could be that
in order to have knowledge we must first have the necessary
equipment to make judgments. This is granted but handled by
the distinction between having an ability and exercising it. The
normative (“what is thinking?”) cannot be reduced to the causal
(“what enables us to think?”).33
The most fundamental problem with Mikhail’s view of
the nature of mind is that the idea of a moral grammar hardwired into the mind is a posit that can never be shown to be
true. Deeming this posit a hypothesis is to use the language of
experimentation to support a thesis the truth of which could
never be shown to be true or false.34 Mikhail’s claims for the
30

Id.
Query how one would “open a mind”?
32
Of course, an MRI scanner will show that certain areas of the brain are
actuated when a person is thinking. While the brain is necessary for one to have
thoughts, the thoughts are not “located” in the brain. See Bennett & Hacker, supra
note 5, at 143.
33
See Hacker, supra note 28, at 134.
31

Neurophysiologists may discover that certain neural configurations are
causally necessary conditions for having the ability to speak a language. But
they will never find any knowledge in the brain. Neither what one knows,
namely truths, facts, or propositions, nor abilities to say, show or tell what
one knows (i.e. abilities constitutive of knowing) can (logically) be found in
the brain. For truths, facts, and propositions, although they can be
recorded on paper or on a computer disc, cannot be recorded on or in the
brain. For whereas we record facts by means of a symbolism, a language,
and write the information down in a notebook or store it on a computer
disc, there is no such thing as the brain’s employing a language,
understanding or speaking a language, nor is there any such thing as human
beings employing brains as repositories for written records, let alone as
computer discs. To say that truths, facts, or propositions are stored, filed
away, or retained in one’s mind is just to say that they are known and not
forgotten.
Id.
34

Richard Rorty makes the same point with respect to Chomsky:

Consider, for example, Chomsky’s claim that there is ‘a fixed biologically
determined function that maps evidence available into acquired knowledge,
uniformly for all languages’. It is hard to see this as an empirical result, since
it is hard to think what could disconfirm it. It is uncontroversial that
organisms that can learn languages have this ability because they have
different neural layouts than other organisms. The layouts, to be sure, are
biologically determined. But in what sense can a function be so determined?
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explanatory efficacy of UMG trade on the language of science
without delivering scientific results. In short, the arguments
for UMG confuse two different discourses, those of scientific
proof and those of speculative metaphysics.
So, what is “mind”? Mind is the ability to engage in
linguistic behavior. “Having a mind” is just having a set of
social skills. Talk of moral grammar is simply an elliptical
reference to the language of morals, not a state of the mind or
brain. This is not to minimize moral problems—far from it. It
is, however, to locate them in their proper place—that is,
“outside” the mind or brain.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have defended the claim that there is a
distinction between the empirical and the conceptual. I have
made the case that conceptual questions precede empirical
investigations because without conceptual clarity, nothing of
sense can follow from experiment. I have used John Mikhail’s
arguments on behalf of UMG to make the case for the
distinction between the conceptual and the empirical. The
issues Mikhail has taken up implicate some of the most basic
debates in contemporary philosophy. But these contemporary
debates are a reprise of a much older debate, that between
rationalism and its critics. The primary issues presented by

To say that a mechanism embodies a function is just to say that its
behavior can usefully be described in terms of a certain specifiable relation
between input and output. Nobody can specify any such relation between the
inputs provided by language-teaching adults and the outputs provided by a
language-learning child, because they are too various. It would be like
trying to specify a relation between the events that occur in the course of
learning to ride a bicycle and those that are the actions of the accomplished
bicyclist.
But, Chomsky tells us, there is a function that, rather than mapping inputs
onto outputs, maps inputs into something called ‘acquired knowledge’. Well,
the bicyclist too has acquired some knowledge. Should we say that he
has acquired it thanks to a biologically determined function that maps the
events of his early, tentative, abortive rides onto a set of internal
representations whose possession is a necessary condition of his newly
acquired ability? We could, but what would count as confirming the existence
of such a mediating entity, in between the learning events and the
actions which produce successful bicycle rides?
Richard Rorty, The Brain as Hardware, Culture as Software, 47 INQUIRY 219, 222
(2004).
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UMG cannot be resolved through further empirical research.35
These issues can never be resolved by empirical methods
because they are, at bottom, philosophical.

35
Mikhail seems to think otherwise. Mikhail, supra note 2, at 148 (“[F]urther
research is needed to clarify the relevant conceptual and evidentiary issues.”).

